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Proceedings of the Annual Acquisition Research Program 
The following article is taken as an excerpt from the proceedings of the annual 
Acquisition Research Program.  This annual event showcases the research projects 
funded through the Acquisition Research Program at the Graduate School of Business 
and Public Policy at the Naval Postgraduate School.  Featuring keynote speakers, 
plenary panels, multiple panel sessions, a student research poster show and social 
events, the Annual Acquisition Research Symposium offers a candid environment 
where high-ranking Department of Defense (DoD) officials, industry officials, 
accomplished faculty and military students are encouraged to collaborate on finding 
applicable solutions to the challenges facing acquisition policies and processes within 
the DoD today.  By jointly and publicly questioning the norms of industry and academia, 
the resulting research benefits from myriad perspectives and collaborations which can 
identify better solutions and practices in acquisition, contract, financial, logistics and 
program management. 
For further information regarding the Acquisition Research Program, electronic 
copies of additional research, or to learn more about becoming a sponsor, please visit 
our program website at: 
www.acquistionresearch.org  
For further information on or to register for the next Acquisition Research 
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Total Ownership Cost: An Exercise in Discipline 
 Presenter:  Michael W. Boudreau, Senior Lecturer, Graduate School of Business & Public 
Policy, Naval Postgraduate School 




Presenter: Michael W. Boudreau 
As a first step, we felt it was important to gather research and data relating to total 
ownership cost initiative, without bias and complicating the process. This, in itself, is quite a 
task, as there had been quite a bit of work done in the area over the last two years in all 
services and numerous DoD programs. 
This presentation is designed to provide some insight and perspective into what we’ve 
drawn upon from the work done. 
Presenter: Brad Naegle 
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Here you have an F-16. When people think about an F-16 this is what they see.  They say 
‘there’s the bird, I can fly that’ or that’s an F-16 you can fly today.   
If you want to fly one tomorrow, it looks more like this. 
Figure 2.  Photo Courtesy of DAU 
Of course this is tests, measurement, diagnostic equipment, all the support equipment, all folks 
at earned Dalton embedded within that are the software processes and go along with it, all the 
training and education that as go out with the crew supporters of the system.  And that is truly 
an F-16 you can fly for longer than a day.  So when we think about things logistically total 













These cost elements here make up the logistics footprint.  This is by no means an 
exhaustive list.  But there are a lot of elements around that that you can see that really impact 











If you divide that out and that green line you see come down into the picture was put 
there on purpose, those items that show up on the right side in green are typically those that 
you can influence after deployment of the system in the field or the fleet.  You can choose to do 
some of those things or not do some of those things or just how you do those things.   
That big chunk on the left that’s in the dark red, are those things that are actually 1) 
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system and 3) without a really significant reengineering, are hard to change.  Of course, that’s 
about the percentage of the cost that’s involved in that and where that cost comes from. 
The green are the things that can be influenced in the field and the fleet and the rest of 
that.  If we’re asking people in the field or the fleet to reduce their costs by 10%, their taking 
10% of that green block off of there and may not even be noticeable to the actual cost of the 
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So, how do we spend money on the system?  If you look at the purple line at the bottom, 
that is how we expend the dollars when we procure and support a system over it’s lifecycle from 
Milestone A, or before Milestone A, through disposal.  That’s important.  Everyone pays a lot of 
attention to that purple line and how we expend those dollars.  The green line on top represents 
the percent of the lifecycle costs that are locked in at various stages.  You can see, by the time 
you get past Milestone B you have effectively locked in the lifecycle and the cost of that system.  
It’s going to be very difficult to change without significant engineering beyond that point.  We 
haven’t spent a great deal of the money for the total ownership of the cost of the system at that 
time but we have determined it. 
Presenter: Michael W. Boudreau 
 
 
 When we talk about total ownership costs we’re talking about a lot of different aspects.  
We’re talking about the personnel, the institutional costs, the system itself, the operating and 
support; that includes maintenance man hours, uniformed military members and civilian 
maintenance man hours, the repair parts, all the test equipment.  It’s easier to get an 
understanding of TOC in the charts just shown to you in the last few minutes.  You could see in 
a pictorial way what was included.  At least some of these items are well beyond the ability of 
program managers to deal with by themselves.  The guidance that came out in 1998 in respect 
to system TOC suggested the program managers should go and get all the help they could 
muster within DoD because TOC reduction was a very big job and certainly had to be done by 









Those are the definitions that go with total ownership cost: One from an institution 
perspective, and the other from perspective of a war-fighting system itself.  You can see those 
costs are pretty inclusive.  If we were to put them on an acquisition timeline, it would cover all 
the RDT&E, the Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation activities and would stretch out 













Figure 3.  CAIV / R-TOC Relationship1 
 
 
The two buzz-words that I think have predominated in discussion related to TOC really 
show up nicely on this milestone and phase chart: The first being cost as an independent 
                                                
1 Kaye, Michael A., Mark S. Sobota, David R. Graham, and Allen L. Gotwald. “Cost As An Independent 
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variable (CAIV).  That is, in my humble description, figuring out how much money that you’ve 
got to devote to a war-fighting system and using that as one of the hard and fast “rocks” that 
constrain how you develop, and what you are able to develop.  Finally, when the system is 
fielded, figuring out ways, throughout the life of the system to reduce ownership costs in areas 
that maybe you didn’t understand completely as you would in ideal circumstances during the 
development itself.  Even with beautifully developed systems, there are always opportunities for 
taking corrective action afterward -- this notion of continuous process improvement that reflects 
in RTOC, Reduction in Total Ownership Cost.  Finding those ways by looking at cost drivers, 
particularly as the system is put into service, either in the field or in the fleet. 
 
Figure 4. Nominal Life-Cycle Cost of Typical DoD Acquisition Program with a Thirty-Year Service Life 2 
Another way of looking at TOC is on a percentage basis by when it happens.  It is 
generally considered about a third, 28% if you want to be more precise looking across a number 
of programs, 28% of the TOC is in the acquisition phase, RDT&E and procurement.  On the 
average, over numerous systems 72% is spent in operating and support costs.  Which part is it 
that the PM is most attentive to?  It is obvious, those things that the PM can touch closest-in.  
That routinely is RDT&E and procurement.  When we say that the PM has to be a total life cycle 
cost system manager then we’re really saying ‘Mr. PM, we think that you need to focus a huge 
amount of your attention also on those operating and support costs and we are holding you 
responsible to do that.’  That sounds, from my perspective, very logical, but in the doing is pretty 
tough.  The reason being, that there’s nothing that really connects in an easily definable, clear 
way, the amount of monies that are going to be spent on those systems that the program 
manager is responsible for.  There is no way to connect him to those O&S costs.  So you have 
to come up with artificial mechanisms: actually putting down operating and support costs in the 
PM’s acquisition strategy and his acquisition baseline.  But then how do you measure it?  It’s 
pretty hard to measure because, of course, those costs may not be incurred until 5 to 15 years 
in the future.  How do you know whether a PM is doing a good job in that respect, or not?  There 
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may be ways of getting at TOC metrics, but it’s not as clear as going out and measuring what’s 




Figure 5.  Design Decisions vs. Expenditure of Funds3 
 
This chart is very similar to the one Brad just showed you.  The thing that I’d like to note 
from the chart is that this is ascribed to the Defense Acquisition University.  The interesting thing 
about this chart is that I pulled it out of a GAO report.  What should you get from all that?  To 
me, we should get that we’ve understood for a long time this mantra about ‘up front and early’: 
Needing to pay close attention to those things that are most important and dear to us at the very 
beginning of a developmental process.  If we wait too long we will be unable to affect, to the 
extent we’d like to, those attributes; be they cost or performance attributes, either one.  Just to 
reiterate, because our milestones and phases don’t show up on this chart.  We think that we get 
perilously close to the 90% locked-in position by the time we get to Milestone B.  For those of 
you who don’t work in acquisition every day, what does that mean?  Milestone B is where the 
program manager gets assigned.  Up until that time it’s probably been a study group made up of 
many stakeholders under the direction of the user.  At Milestone B when there’s a formal 
decision to go ahead with this program, then a program manager is assigned probably just 
before that but not long before that.  So when we talk about upfront and early from the 
                                                
3 U.S. General Accounting Office. “Best Practices: Setting Requirements Differently Could Reduce 
Weapon Systems’ Total Ownership Costs.” Report to the Subcommittee on Readiness and Management 




= ==========^Åèìáëáíáçå=qÜÉçêó=~åÇ=mê~ÅíáÅÉ=Ñçê=~=qê~åëÑçêãáåÖ=aÉÑÉåëÉ=======- 41 - 
=
=
perspective of influencing TOC we’re talking while the concept is still in the hands of the user 
and is not actually being developed by the acquisition community.   
Presenter: Brad Naegle 
Figure 6. Photo courtesy of DAU 
 
 We tried to find some examples of this.  This happens to be the program that I 
managed: The Extended Service Program.  It was a service life extension program of the 2.5-
ton fleet of trucks.  This shows the truck and some of the neat things we did to it when we 
remanufactured it.  The remanufacturing process tore the truck down to components and built it 
up like a new system.  The idea was to start with an old 2.5-ton truck and end with a 2.5-ton 
truck.  What we were trying to attack was the total ownership cost, the operations and support 
costs of this truck.  But we did add some enhancements as we went through the thing.  Some of 
my students who see this chart are kind of amazed.  We said we put in a new heating and 
defrosting system that did two really unique things for that truck series: Heated and defrosted.  
That doesn’t sound like a great thing until you drove the old truck, then you realized it was a 
really great thing.  We did enhance it as we went through this. 
The whole idea was to reduce the total ownership cost.  This is kind of what it looked like 














First of all, the entire weapons system cost of the truck was about $57,000.  That 
included everything up until that point.  The contract price was much less, around $44,000 a 
truck, but the fully burdened cost was $57,000 per truck.  The blue line on the bottom is the total 
ownership cost of the new 2.5-ton extended service program.  This data was extracted from 
100,000 miles of testing.  It was not projected but a projection of something we had empirical 
data for.  The red line at the top was the cost of supporting an existing 2.5 ton truck in the 
system and reflects that they were very old and very costly.  They went about 1,000 miles 
between hardware mission failures.  They were very costly to support.   
We were bringing on a new series of truck, that Mike Boudreau was in charge of at the 
time, the family of medium tactical vehicles, but we couldn’t bring them on fast enough because 
of the costs that are involved.  So, we needed to do something to the fleet to keep the total 
ownership costs down. 
As I was trying to sell this program as the program manager, I looked at the difference 
between the red line and the blue line equaled the total cost of getting a new ESP truck.  That 
happened at just between seven and eight years.  The truck was basically paid for in less than 
eight years of service as far as the differential in cost between the old and the new truck.  The 
truck was re-baselined to 0 miles and it had a twenty year life span beyond that.  So, if you go 
all the way out to the 20-year mark, the savings, per truck, ended up being $109,258.  Which 
was a magic number because it was about the cost of a brand new FMTV replacement 2.5-ton 
truck.  Not only did I pay for my own efforts within eight years but if you kept one it’s entire life, 
you saved enough money to buy it’s replacement.  Great story but it didn’t go over particularly 
well.  People didn’t like the idea of remanufactured trucks.  Nonetheless, that was the concept 









Presenter: Mike Boudreau 
One thing worth mentioning; there is a wonderful database out in our acquisition 
community related to TOC.  What we’ve done here is put down some of the sites where you can 
get some good information that shows you how robust the effort has been over the last few 
years.  If you’re not familiar with some of these acronyms; AKSS is the Acquisition Knowledge 
Sharing System which is a DoD/OSD website that replaces what was on CD ROM.  It was 
formerly called the Defense Acquisition Desk Book.  In fact you can get the web version of that 
on websites today even though it has become obsolete.  DAU is the Defense Acquisition 
University.  They have quite a body of material that has put together on TOC.  IDA, the Institute 










There it is.  By way of apology one of the things that’s happened in the intervening time 
since we did this research was that Comanche has fallen off this list.  Not because they did 
anything really wrong in the way that they wanted to proceed with TOC but maybe the program 
was simply too costly when combined with other warfighter needs.  Also there’s a Fire Support 
Command and Control Army System that shows up under the fielded system that is a follow-on 
to AFATIDS for those of you who are followers of army command and control systems.  That’s 
also fallen off the list recently. 
At any rate, as you can see here is that in each of the services there were 10 TOC pilot 
systems, pilot programs that were used to put together and test R-TOC ideas.  There are a lot of 
them here that I’m sure you are familiar with besides the ones that I’ve mentioned. 
AAAV is the Marine Corps Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle.  It’s now called EFV 
the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle.  The name has changed but the system is the same.  MTVR 
has been discussed earlier today that is the Marine Corp medium tactical vehicle replacement.  
H60 is a helicopter program.  EA-6B is the Prowler an electronic aircraft.  CVN68 is the aircraft 
carrier that has been used as a test bed for some of these R-TOC ideas.  AWACS you’re 
familiar with and JSTARS.  I suspect many of you are familiar with.  F-117 is the stealth fighter.  
F-16 is ubiquitous, everybody knows about it.  So, you can see there are quite a selection of 
different programs that have provided test beds, some of which have already begun to show 
dividends in terms of R-TOC.  In some of these systems, it will be years before we see the 



















There are lots of different TOC initiatives.  KPPs are Key Performance Parameters.  
Those are parameters that are identified by users as elements that are most important to a 
system that’s being considered for acquisition.  KPPs doctrinally now show up in what used to 
be called the ORD, Operational Requirement Document but is now called the CDD, the 
Capability Development Document and its follow on user document that supports production.  At 
any rate KPPs are those areas that are so important to the user that if they cannot be achieved 
that throws into question whether or not we should go on with this development and acquisition 
of the system. 
 
You would think if cost is really important to the DoD that at least on some programs you 
would see a TOC metric as one of those KPPs.  I submit to you that you have to look a long way 
to find that because that is not what is most attractive to military users.  Being in the military 
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what good is it to have the world’s greatest warfighting system if we can’t afford to acquire it, or 
later on, to maintain it or sustain it?  We think the KPPs are an area where we ought to start 
defining the number of dollars we are going to spend on a program and make cost so important 




Reliability Centered Maintenance is important.  RCM has been around for a very long 
time.  That’s another thing that the GAO has played back to us of things that we’ve known for 
years and years, decades for heavens sake.  Lots of those TOC pilot programs are working on 
going back to review the basics of reliability centered maintenance, which is a very worthwhile 
endeavor. 
You will hear a lot more about PBL, Performance Based Logistics throughout the day.  
That is very closely related to the control of TOC.  PBL has to be a constituent consideration for 














Cost drivers, looking at those things that are most expensive in fielded systems, is one 
of the very fruitful ways of getting at R-TOC for legacy systems.  Through modification of 
systems, maybe we can reduce the cost of ownership. 
Value engineering is another program that has been around forever.  Value engineering 
kicks in after production starts.  Often we spend many more dollars than is necessary in early 
production because of things that we didn’t understand completely, but that we begin to 
understand more fully as time goes on.  The way that we can get at needed changes and 
address the associated production and sustainment costs is through value engineering change 
proposals. 
Those are just a few of the TOC initiatives.  Frankly, we haven’t, in our study come up 
with any of those ideas.  They’ve all been out there being used by one program or another 










By way of conclusion, we think that the earlier you begin considerations of Total 
Ownership Cost in a program acquisition, the more effective you are likely to be.  We also think 
as I’ve mentioned before, that focusing on ownership cost as a Key Performance Parameter 
(KPP) makes it so important that it cannot be traded away.  We also think there are a lot of 
things counterbalancing TOC.  Some of them are pretty simple.  We tell people to do one thing 
but we incentivize them to do another.  What happens to operating and support savings?  Can 
the community that makes the savings, use the savings to plow back in and get other beneficial 
results?  Oftentimes not! Those savings are taken away and used elsewhere, probably for very 
useful things, but it’s a disincentive for program managers and users.  We think that combat 
developers, the user community, is not as focused on how much war-fighting system costs, as 
maybe they should be.  They are interested in warfighting capability, not how that capability is 
going to be sustained.  We think that program managers and material developers typically will 
follow the lead of the user community.  If the user community identifies the importance of 
ownership cost and makes sure that TOC translates into the acquisition program baseline, the 
program managers and their communities will follow that lead and manage it to the best of their 
ability.  We also think R-TOC should be a continued focus in legacy systems and in the post-
deployment phase because there are always ways of taking cost out of systems even though it 
may take a little bit of up-front money in order to get yourself to that point. 
One of the things that we think is an important pathology that in fact the TOC databases 
have not really matured yet.   
In all the services there are problems with databases.  When you think about that, if you 
don’t have a good cost and performance database that describes your legacy systems, then do 
you have all the tools that you need in order to progress with the follow-on systems?  We think 
the answer is that we’ve not come up with databases that are as complete and flexible as we 
need.  It’s been a problem in all the services and all the services have devoted R-TOC focus in 
trying to develop better databases.  Oftentimes, those databases exist but they exist in a lot of 
different places in ways that are somewhere between difficult and impossible to patch together 








By way of recommendations from the research we’ve done: 
• It’s clear that we think the TOC ought to be described in Key Performance 
Parameters (KPP).  That will cause program managers and their staffs to continue to 
pay attention to the total life cycle cost of the system. 
• More work needs to be done to continue to enhance our databases such that they 
will be good tools for us to do more focused work in reducing TOC.   
• We think that we have contractual mechanisms, but we need to refocus those 
toward keeping the contractor involved in R-TOC.  Once again, there have been 
some initiatives that have been done in the pilot programs that look to have great 
promise in that respect.   
• Leadership support is necessary in order to make TOC a focus within each of the 
services. Certainly without that leadership support, will those key questions be asked 
at our different meetings, such as milestone decision meetings?  Without the hard 
TOC questions being asked at the leadership level, the workforce won’t focus on the 
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